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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall**
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a
significantly higher number of published decisions in the area of
employment discrimination during the 2010 survey period.' It is too
early to tell whether this will become a new trend or is a one year
aberration. However, the Eleventh Circuit handed down eight published
Title VII decisions during the survey period (as opposed to only one
published decision the year before), and thirteen published employment
discrimination opinions overall (as opposed to only three during the 2009
survey period). Three of these decisions were in the ever troublesome
area of sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court of the United States continued to be active in the
employment discrimination arena as well. In Lewis v. City of Chicago,2
the Court clarified the application of the appropriate statute of
limitations in the context of a disparate impact case, and in the process,
allowed a class of African-American firefighter candidates to move

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of
Virginia (B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1975). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit during 2010. Cases arising under the following Federal statutes
are included: The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
0§621-634 (2006); the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2006);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006);
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2006).
For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the prior survey
period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination, 2009
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1073 (2010).

2.

130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
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forward with their Title VII class action lawsuit against the City of
Chicago's firefighter entrance exam.' In other action, the Court in
Perdue v. Kenny,' and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,' determined the
propriety of enhanced attorney fee awards for outstanding results. 6
I.

A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Disparate Treatment. In Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers,
Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with the application of the socalled Vince Lombardi rule' in the context of a national origin discrimination case. The plaintiff, Eliuth Alvarez, a Cuban-American, was hired
as the controller for Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc.9 Alvarez reported
to Heidi Verdezoto, the Chief Financial Officer, who had a reputation as
someone who was "impossible to please."'o Indeed, Alvarez's two
predecessors, one an Indian-American and the other an Anglo-American,
had both been fired because they could not meet Heidi's strict standards." Predictably, Alvarez could not meet those standards either,
and after approximately three months, it was determined that she would
be fired as soon as a replacement could be found. In the meantime,
Alvarez wrote a letter to CEO Edwin Verdezoto complaining that she
was being discriminated against because she was Cuban. After receiving
this letter, the Verdezotos decided not to wait for a replacement and
fired Alvarez the following morning.12 Alvarez filed suit pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)," complaining of

3. Id. at 2196, 2199, 2201.
4. 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
6. Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1673-74.
7. 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010).
8. According to the Vince Lombardi rule, none of the players could accuse Coach
Lombardi of discrimination "because he treated all of them like dogs." Id. at 1258 (citing
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1301 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007)).
9. Id. at 1258-59.
10. Id. at 1258.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1260-62.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
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national origin discrimination and retaliation." The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the company."
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit, as to the national origin discrimination claim, noted that "Heidi was within her rights to insist on a
controller who could whip the company's books into shape overnight
while accommodating her own prickly personality and performing every
task perfectly, even if there was little or no chance she would ever find
such a miracle worker."" The court went on to conclude that "[tihis
[was] a classic example of the Vince Lombardi rule: someone who treats
everyone badly is not guilty of discriminating against anyone.""
Accordingly the court affirmed as to the discrimination claim."s With
respect to the retaliation claim, although emphasizing that the
retaliation provision does not insulate from discipline an employee "who
[is] already on thin ice," the court noted that the disputed facts
concerning the timing of this decision made summary judgment
inappropriate and thus remanded this aspect of the case for further
proceedings.19
20 the Eleventh
In Brown v. Alabama Department of ransportation,
Circuit was confronted with the latest chapter in what has been many
years of civil rights lawsuits against various state agencies in the State
of Alabama, including the Alabama Department of Transportation. The
plaintiff, Geneva Brown, an African-American civil engineer, had worked
for the Alabama DOT since 1977. She brought a Title VII lawsuit
against the agency, alleging that she was denied nine different
promotions between 2000 and 2005 on account of her race. 2 ' Following
a jury trial, the jury agreed with Brown and awarded her $65,697.65 in
back pay and $25,000 in damages for mental anguish.22 On appeal
however, the Eleventh Circuit, after applying the familiar McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green2 3 circumstantial evidence model of proof to each
promotion, concluded that the evidence would support an inference of
discrimination or retaliation in only three of the nine promotion
decisions." As a result, the court of appeals reversed the district

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1270-71.
597 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1167-68.
Id. at 1173.

23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. Brown, 597 F.3d at 1181-83.
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court's decision and remanded the case for a recalculation of the
plaintiff's back pay award.25
2. Disparate Impact. In Lewis v. City of Chicago,2 6 the Supreme
Court was confronted with a disparate impact challenge against the
written examination utilized by the Chicago Fire Department for all
applicants to the firefighter position. The city utilized the written
examination in July 1995.27 Thereafter it randomly hired its firefighter
candidates from among those who were deemed "well qualified," in other
words, "those who scored 89 or above (out of 100)" on the test.28 The
plaintiffs were six African-American applicants, all of whom were in the
"qualified" category (they scored between 65 and 88 on the test).29
They filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that the city's examination
discriminated against them in its application on account of their race. 0
In the ensuing lawsuit pursuant to Title VII, the district court agreed
that the examination had a "severe disparate impact against African
Americans," and ordered that the City randomly hire 132 of the AfricanAmerican applicants in the qualified category, while also awarding back
pay." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed this decision, finding that the earliest Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge filed by the plaintiffs was
untimely because it had been filed more than 300 days after the alleged
discriminatory act, in this case the administration of the exam. 2
When the case came before the Supreme Court, the issue framed was
whether a plaintiff who failed to file a timely charge as to the adoption
of a practice (in this case, the city's initial administration of the written
examination) may assert a disparate impact claim following a timely
charge challenging the later application of that practice-the city's
selection of firefighters based upon the results of the exam.33 The
Court concluded that the plaintiffs could bring such a claim.34 In
reaching its decision, the Court was greatly influenced by the express

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1189.
130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
Id. at 2195.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2195-96.
Id. at 2196.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2195.
Id. at 2197.
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language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,as which codified the burden
of proof in disparate impact claims." Under this language, a claim
could be made by showing that an employer "uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact" on a prohibited ground."
Because the city used the results of its examination each time it selected
applicants, its practice was found to fall within the scope of the statutory
language, and the plaintiffs' case was allowed to proceed."
3. Religious Discrimination. Title VII claimants can present their
case either through the submission of direct or circumstantial evidence."
In Dixon v. Hallmark Cos.,4o the Eleventh Circuit was
confronted with the more uncommon of these two types of evidence,
potential direct evidence." The plaintiffs worked as a husband and
wife team-property manager and maintenance technician, respectively-at an apartment complex owned by the defendant. The company
maintained an established policy that religious items were not allowed
to be displayed in the management office." During a periodic inspection by the plaintiffs' supervisor, the supervisor noticed a picture of
flowers hanging on the wall of the management office that included the
words, "Remember the Lilies ... Matthew 6:28.'13 Upon confirming
that this was a Bible verse, the supervisor directed that the artwork be
removed. The plaintiff wife stated that she first wanted to talk with her
husband about the issue. While she was gone, the supervisor called her
superior, who directed the supervisor to remove the picture herself.
When the plaintiffs returned to the office, a dispute about the painting
broke out, and both plaintiffs were fired." During the course of the
dispute, the supervisor allegedly remarked to the plaintiff husband,
"You're fired, too. You're too religious."' The plaintiffs then filed suit
pursuant to Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 6 On appeal,

35. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
37. Id. § 2000e-2(kX1XAXi) (emphasis added).
38. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2197-98.
39. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010).
40. 627 F.3d 849 (11th Cir. 2010).
41. Id. at 854.
42. Id. at 852-53.
43. Id. at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 853-54.
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however, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that the alleged remark
made by the supervisor to the husband, if believed, would constitute
Because the supervisor
direct evidence of religious discrimination.
denied making this comment, the court of appeals found that there were
disputed issues of material fact and remanded the case for further
proceedings."
4. Sexual Harassment. In Beckford v. Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of third party sexual
harassment.so The question before the court was whether the Florida
Department of Corrections could be held liable under Title VII because
it failed to remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by the
male inmates at the Martin Correctional Institution." The plaintiffs
were fourteen former female employees at Martin who had previously
worked as nurses or in other non-security positions.5 2 The nurses
would interact with the prisoners on a daily basis to "pass out medication to inmates, answer sick calls, and respond to medical emergencies[,]" and the other plaintiffs frequently interacted with the prisoners
in a similar manner." There really was no question in this case as to
whether the inmates created a sexually hostile environment. While
performing their duties, the plaintiffs were routinely subjected to very
graphic sexual language and the practice of "gunning," in which inmates
exposed themselves and masturbated directly at the plaintiffs." This
practice of gunning was a particularly "frequent phenomenon." When
the plaintiffs' complaints to prison management did not result in any
attempt to curb the inmates' behavior, the plaintiffs brought suit against
the Department of Corrections pursuant to Title VII. Following a jury
trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded each of them $45,000
in damages."
On appeal, one issue was whether the department could be found
liable under Title VII for the admittedly harassing behavior of the third
party inmates." The department argued that the behavior of the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 855.
Id. at 855-59.
605 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 953, 957.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 955.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.
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inmates could not be reasonably controlled and that the plaintiffs knew
about the nature of their working environment when they accepted their
job positions." The Eleventh Circuit, drawing upon its prior precedent
finding employers liable under Title VII for the sexually harassing
behavior of third party customers," disagreed.o The court, although
noting that "some harassment by inmates" could not be avoided, held
that the department also could not "refuse to adopt reasonable measures
Given this conclusion, the
to curtail harassment by inmates."
Eleventh Circuit affirmed."
In a similar vein, the Eleventh Circuit, in Reeves v. C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc.63 sitting en banc, struck a blow for work place propriety.64 The plaintiff was employed as a transportation sales representative for the shipping company, C.H. Robinson, at its Birmingham,
Alabama facility.65 She "was the only woman working on the sales
floor" along with six other male coworkers in an area described as a "pod
of cubicles."6 To put it mildly, the language out on the sales floor was
coarse, described by the court as "incessant, vulgar, and generally
offensive."
While much of the vulgar language was not genderspecific, the plaintiff's male coworkers referred to individuals on a daily
basis as "bitch, fucking bitch, fucking whore, crack whore, and cunt."'
The male coworkers also routinely "tuned the office radio to a crude
morning show" that had graphic discussions about sexual matters; and
"[oln one occasion, [one of the coworkers] displayed a pornographic image
of a fully naked woman . . . on his computer screen."'

When the

plaintiff's complaints about this environment fell on deaf ears, she
resigned from her position and brought suit against the company
pursuant to Title VII.VO The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the company, finding that the plaintiff "was not intentionally
singled out for adverse treatment because of her sex."" The Eleventh

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See, e.g., Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).
Beckford, 605 F.3d at 957-58.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 962.
594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
See id. at 803.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 804.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 806.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Circuit, in its initial panel decision, held that a jury question had been
presented and reversed the summary judgment ruling.72 However, that
opinion was vacated and the Eleventh Circuit reheard the case en
banc."
In its en banc opinion, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the concept
that "general vulgarity or references to sex that are indiscriminate in
nature will not, standing alone, generally be actionable."" At the same
time, the court held as follows:
Nevertheless, a member of a protected group cannot be forced to
endure pervasive, derogatory conduct and references that are genderspecific in the workplace, just because the workplace may be otherwise
rife with generally indiscriminate vulgar conduct. Title VII does not
offer boorish employers a free pass to discriminate against their
employees specifically on account of gender just because they have
tolerated pervasive but indiscriminate profanity as well.
The court went on to hold that even though the words had not been
specifically directed at the plaintiff, it was enough for her to hear
coworkers referring to females on a daily basis as "bitches [and] whores
to understand that they view[ed] women negatively, and in a

...

humiliating or degrading way."" Finding that it was up to the jury to
decide if the necessary intent could be inferred from this behavior, the
court reversed the summary judgment, and remanded the case for
further proceedings."
As most Title VII practitioners are very much aware, Title VII sexual
harassment claims are often accompanied by common law tort claims
under state law. It was the accompanying tort claims, in Myers v.
Central Florida Investments, Inc.," that predominated the court's
decision.7 ' The plaintiff originally began working for the defendant, a
real estate company specializing in the development and sale of timeshare resorts, as a sales person. However, she was also a very talented
cosmetologist, and her dream was to one day develop a spa at one of the
defendant's resorts. The defendant's CEO eventually authorized creation
of the spa. As it turned out, he had a romantic interest in the plaintiff.
On one occasion, the CEO asked her to dance at a company function and

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 811 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 813-14.
592 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1205.
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unexpectedly kissed her during the dance. On two occasions, he offered
her boyfriend one million dollars if he could spend the night with the
plaintiff. He also made several marriage proposals. Over a period of
time, the CEO's desires evolved into a number of instances involving his
touching the plaintiff inappropriately and making other suggestive,
inappropriate comments. The plaintiff asked him on many occasions to
stop his behavior, but to no avail.' Inexplicably, the plaintiff and the
CEO "continued to work closely together, and continued to be friends."
Eventually the plaintiff's continued rejection of the CEO's advances was
her demise, and she was terminated from her position. The plaintiff's
original lawsuit resulted in a summary judgment finding in favor of the
defendant."
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that sufficient
evidence had been presented on her claims to defeat summary judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings.' On remand, the case
proceeded to a jury trial. As to the plaintiff's Title VII claim, the jury
found that although the plaintiff had been subjected to a sexually hostile
work environment, no sexually harassing conduct had occurred after
September 15, 2000; accordingly, her Title VII claim was barred by the
statute of limitations.' "As for the [plaintiff's] battery claim, however,
the jury awarded [the plaintiff] $102,223.14 in compensatory damages
and $5,276,640.00 in punitive damages."
On appeal a second time,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury in all respects, agreeing that the
plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by the statute of limitations and
further agreeing that the jury's damages award was constitutional.'
5. Retaliation. In order to support a retaliation claim under Title
VII's "opposition clause,"" a plaintiff must have complained about an
alleged act of discrimination that the plaintiff reasonably and objectively
believed was discriminatory, based on the facts and circumstances."
Whether the plaintiff, in Howard v. Walgreen Co., had such a
reasonable, objective belief was the issue presented to the court."o The

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1205-07.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1209-10.
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1223, 1225, 1227.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
605 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1242.
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plaintiff was an African-American pharmacist who worked at a
Walgreen's store in Ft. Myers, Florida. Feeling ill with cold or flu like
symptoms on December 7th, the plaintiff called in sick for work. The
following day, the plaintiff felt worse and called in again, stating that he
would not be in to work that evening, and likely would not be in the
following evening as well, December 9th." After the plaintiff was in
fact absent on December 9th, but without calling in, his supervisor called
the plaintiff's house and "left a [voice] message stating that [the
plaintiff's] 'job was in jeopardy' because he 'pulled a No call/No
show.' 92 In a subsequent telephone conversation between the plaintiff
and his supervisor concerning this voice message, a dispute between the
two ensued, which resulted in the supervisor remarking "who the hell do
you think you are," and hanging up." The plaintiff then delivered a
letter to Walgreen's upper management complaining about the way he
was being treated and stating that he felt that his treatment was based
on discrimination. When the plaintiff returned to work, he learned that
his supervisor had terminated his employment. In his subsequent
lawsuit under Title VII alleging retaliation, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $300,000 in damages.94
On appeal however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the jury's
verdict could not stand, finding as a matter of law that the plaintiff had
not engaged in protected conduct." Engaging in protected conduct
required the plaintiff to have held a reasonable objective belief that he
had been discriminated against." The court of appeals concluded that
to have been discriminated against, the plaintiff was required to have
been subjected to an adverse employment action.97 The closest thing
to an adverse employment action that the plaintiff could cite to was the
supervisor's voice message telling the plaintiff that his "job was in
jeopardy."" Finding that this voice message fell "well short of an
adverse action," the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment for the
plaintiff and directed that a judgment be entered in favor of Walgreen's.99

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1240-41.
1241.
1241-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1242.
1245.
1244.
1245.
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Remedies

1. Consent Decrees. In Birmingham FirefightersAss'n 117 v. City
of Birmingham,"oo over three decades of civil rights litigation regarding
the City of Birmingham and the personnel board of Jefferson County
came to an end. 01 After all of that litigation, the final judicial pronouncement turned on a minor procedural ruling. 02 The history of the
litigation produced several comprehensive consent decrees and close
district court supervision concerning the hiring practices for the city. In
2007, in response to two vacant positions on the Jefferson County
Personnel Board, the district court exercised its authority under the
consent decrees and appointed two individuals to fill the positions. 03
"Shortly thereafter, and perhaps in response to the district court's
appointments, the Alabama legislature passed Act 408, . . . [which]

entirely reconstituted the composition of the Board," increasing the
number of its members from three to seven and requiring that two of the
members be African-American.104 Soon thereafter, the district court
entered an order finding that Act 408 was void and in violation of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.105 It was this
order that the City of Birmingham appealed in this case. However, two
months later, the district court entered another order, this time a final
order, terminating the personnel board's consent decree. No party
appealed this order.o'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the order before
it was a final, appealable order.o' The court of appeals noted that 28
U.S.C. § 1292'0 initially gave the court jurisdiction because the order
was in the nature of an interlocutory injunction.109 However, the court
also noted that intervening events could affect its jurisdiction, which it

100. 603 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010).
101. Id. at 1251 n.1.
102. Id. at 1254-55.
103. Id. at 1251-52.
104. Id. at 1252.
105. Id. at 1253; see U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
106. Birmingham Fire Fighters,603 F.3d at 1253-54.
107. Id. at 1254-55.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006). Section 1292(aXl) provides in part that a court of appeals
has jurisdiction to hear appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the
United States . .. granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions. . .. "
109. Birmingham Fire Fighters, 603 F.3d at 1254.
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found to be the case with respect to the subsequent final order."1 o The
court of appeals found that this final order, which reaffirmed the earlier
interlocutory order, stripped the court of its jurisdiction, and the city's
appeal was dismissed."' Hence, with this whimper, over three
decades of civil rights litigation came to an end.
2. Sanctions. The Eleventh Circuit took a hard swing at vexatious
litigation with its decision in Norelus v. Denny's, Inc."2 In this case,
the court of appeals upheld sanctions of almost $400,000 against Karen
C. Amlong and William R. Amlong of the civil rights law firm Amlong
and Amlong in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida." The Amlongs represented
Floride Norelus, an illegal immigrant from Haiti, in a Title VII lawsuit
against Denny's, in which the plaintiff alleged that she had suffered
from nearly a year of sexual abuse, including rape, while working for
two Denny's restaurants. After extensive discovery, not a shred of
evidence could be developed to support the plaintiffs allegations. 14
When the plaintiff herself was deposed, she proved to be a very
unreliable witness, lying at various points during her deposition.
Indeed, the only evidence supporting her allegations was a sixty-three
page errata sheet that her counsel submitted following her deposition,
making 868 changes to the plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony. The
district court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, after which, the
defendant moved for an award of sanctions against both the plaintiff and
her counsel. Without an evidentiary hearing, the district court imposed
sanctions against the Amlong law firm in the amount of $389,739.07,
which represented the attorney fees and costs incurred by the defendants following the filing of the plaintiff's errata sheet.115
An earlier appeal to the Eleventh Circuit resulted in a remand of the
case on procedural grounds." 6 On remand, the district court again
imposed sanctions against the Amlongs, this time in the amount of
$387,738.45.1n

The Amlongs then brought a second appeal, and the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed.'
The court noted that the Amlongs' filing
of "the novella-length errata sheet making a slew of material changes to

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1254-55.
628 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1273, 1297 n.9, 1302.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1276-79.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1279-80.
Id. at 1280, 1302.
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their client's deposition testimony was [clearly] improper."e19 The
court also found that counsel "unreasonably and vexatiously" perpetuated the litigation after this point.120 As the court noted, "[sItill, like
Ahab hunting the whale, the Amlongs relentlessly pursued the claims
....

When the truth was thrust in the Amlongs' faces, they stubbornly

ignored it and kept on litigating."121 That decision turned out to be an
expensive one indeed.
II.

A.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Piggybacking

Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),' 22 a
plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or
appropriate state or local agency before commencing an action for age
discrimination or retaliation.'2 3 In Sheffield v. United Parcel Service,124 an unpublished decision, the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of an age discrimination suit because the plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.125 The district court found that
Sheffield failed to state a claim because he did not file a charge of
discrimination before commencing his civil action.126 On appeal
Sheffield argued that the district court erred in finding that he could not
"piggyback" his claim onto claims previously brought by others.2 7 The
court of appeals affirmed, finding that Sheffield did not meet the
piggybacking requirements. 2 1
As the court explained,
[tihe "single filing rule," sometimes referred to as the "piggybacking
rule," provides a limited exception to the ADEA's charge-filing requirement. The rule provides that, in some circumstances, a plaintiff who
did not file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC may
"piggyback" onto a timely charge filed by another individual. To qualify

119. Id. at 1281.
120. Id. at 1287.
121. Id. at 1282-83.
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
124. 403 F. App'x 452 (11th Cir. 2010).
125. Id. at 453.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 453, 455.
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for this exception a plaintiff must show that "(1) the relied upon charge
is not invalid, and (2) the individual claims of the filing and non-filing
plaintiff arise out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time
frame."129

Confirming the continued vitality of the rule set forth in Hipp v.
Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,"o the panel held that the "same
time frame" requirement is still needed in order to successfully
piggyback a new claim onto an older one."' Holding that the earlier
claims did not arise in the same time frame as Sheffield's, the panel
concluded that Sheffield could not piggyback his claim onto the earlier
claims.' 2
B. Adverse Employment Action
In some instances, a plaintiffs attempted claim can fail because the
individual has not suffered a cognizable adverse employment action.
Guimaraes v. NORS,"a another unpublished decision, presented just
such a case. Guimaraes brought suit when his employer moved him to
an isolated work cubicle after female co-workers complained about his
behavior. The plaintiff appealed an adverse summary judgment ruling
in the district court on his resulting disparate treatment claim. The
trial court found that Guimaraes was not entitled to a trial on this claim
because he had not suffered an adverse employment action as a result
of the move to a different work area under the circumstances presented." The court of appeals similarly held that the employer's articulated reason for the move-complaints by coworkers-was not suspect."'
The Impact of Gross v. FBL FinancialServices Motivating Factor
When announced, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.136 was viewed by most as a pro-employer
decision. Its application in the Eleventh Circuit during the survey
period would seem to indicate otherwise, however. During the survey
period, two reported decisions applying Gross went against the employer.
C.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001).
Sheffield, 403 F. App'x at 454-55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
366 F. App'x 51 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 55.
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
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The case of Mock v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.," 7 had originally
been decided in the plaintiff's favor in the district court in 2007.a13 In
May 2009, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment."as Several days later, in June of that year, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Gross ruling that a higher proof standard does
not apply in ADEA cases.4 o Age must be the employer's motivating
factor before unlawful age discrimination can be found under the ADEA
following Gross."' After the decision in Gross was announced, Bell
Helicopter Textron moved for post judgment relief in the district court
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b),14 2 claiming that an
improper jury instruction based upon a pre-Gross burden of proof
allocation had resulted in the unfavorable verdict in the earlier
proceeding. The district court denied the motion and this second appeal
ensued.'a

Finding an absence of the extraordinary circumstances necessary to
grant such relief under Rule 60, the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial.1'
Observing that "something more than a 'mere' change in the law is
necessary" to invoke Rule 60 relief, even though some factors weighed
in favor of granting such relief, the Eleventh Circuit held the district
court's decision was entitled to deference. 45
Another emplbyer fared no better following application of another
aspect of Gross to its facts. In Mora v. Jackson Memorial Foundation,
Inc., a panel vacated a ruling below that had been favorable to the
employer."' The employer, Jackson, had obtained summary judgment
below based upon the "same decision" affirmative defense.148 A
unanimous panel reversed this ruling, concluding that under Gross,
employers are no longer entitled to the defense in ADEA actions."

137. 373 F. App'x 989 (11th Cir. 2010).
138. Id. at 990.
139. Id.
140. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.4.
141. Id. at 2352.
142. FED. R. Civ, P. 60.
143. Mock, 373 F. App'x at 990.
144. Id. at 991-92.
145. Id. at 991 (alteration in original) (quoting Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442
(11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. 597 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2010).
147. Id. at 1202.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) "Because an ADEA plaintiff must establish
'but for' causality, no 'same decision' affirmative defense can exist. . . ." Id. at 1204.
149. Id. at 1204.
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Because the Supreme Court has excluded the whole idea of a "mixed
motive" ADEA claim-and the corresponding "same decision" defense-we
need not consider the district court's analysis of [Jackson's] affirmative
defense. Instead, we look at [Jackson's] motion for summary judgment
in accord with the "ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk
of failing to prove their claims." Making all reasonable inferences in
[Mora's] favor, we look to determine whether a material factual
question exists on this record about whether [Jackson] discriminated
against her. 50
Concluding that there were factual issues to be decided, the panel
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.' 5 '
III. AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES ACT
The Authors note an uptick in reported Americans with Disability Act
(ADA)' decisions during the survey period. Five of those decisions,
including one published decision, are worthy of note.
A. Qualified Individuals with Disabilitiesand Reasonable
Accommodation
'"To establish a prima facie case of [disability] discrimination under the
ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) [that] he is disabled; (2) he is a qualified
individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because
of his disability."'s The ADA defines a "qualified individual" as an
individual "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions" of his job.154 "[E]ssential
functions 'are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual
with a disability is actually required to perform."" 5 However, an
employer is not required to alter the essential functions of a job to
accommodate an individual with a disability and has a say in what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation. 56
Two decisions issued during the survey period demonstrate these
principles. In light of the shift in focus of ADA claims following
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act of

150. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351).
151. Id. at 1205.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
153. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007).
154. Id. at 1256; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
155. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
156. Id. at 1256.
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2008,157 the reasonableness of requested accommodations shall continue to be an area of disagreement between employers and employees and
shall serve as a primary contention in litigation disputes.
In Anderson v. Embarq/Sprint,'s Anderson, a distribution center
employee, who had been injured while at a grocery store, sought an
accommodation from Embarq for his injury and requested a light duty
Anderson
assignment.15 9 Embarq denied Anderson's request.so
summary
for
motion
employer's
sued and the district court granted his
61
panel
the
court,
district
the
in
Affirming the ruling
judgment.
to
failed
had
Anderson
that
decision,
concluded, in an unpublished
the
case
in
facie
prima
required
establish a necessary element of his
district court, that he could perform an essential function of his
particular job-lifting and carrying boxes frequently and continuously-under the particular accommodation he requested, a forklift only
assignment.'6 2 "Accordingly, lifting was an essential function of
Anderson's job. Anderson's request for forklift work only, however,
eliminates this essential function. Thus, because Anderson's requested
accommodation would eliminate an essential function of his job, it was
not reasonable and was therefore not required under the statute."'
Anderson, therefore, was not "qualified" in the context of the ADA."*
To the same effect, in McKane v. UBS FinancialServices, Inc.,"' the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed another district court's summary judgment for
the employer in another accommodation case.'66 McKane sought the
relocation of his workplace away from coworkers so he could interact
peacefully with them. His employer denied the request.'"' McKane
had been fired by UBS for verbally abusing his coworkers. The
culminating incident occurred in his office after he summoned a
coworker there and a verbal dispute ensued. Concluding that the
accommodation sought by McKane would not necessarily have eliminated his need to interact with coworkers, the district court concluded that

157. ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)(codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12210 (2006); 29 U.S.C. 705-706 (2006)).
158. 379 F. App'x 924 (11th Cir. 2010).
159. Id. at 927 n.5.
160. Id. at 927.
161. Id. at 926.
162. Id. at 928.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 363 F. App'x 679 (11th Cir. 2010).
166. Id. at 682.
167. Id.
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his requested accommodation was not reasonable.168 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed-"McKane has failed to show a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether he was a qualified individual for the purpose of
his ADA failure to accommodate claim ....

B.

"

Medical Inquiries
The ADA restricts an employer's ability to make medical examinations
or inquiries that relate to a job applicant's disability status.7 o Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc.,1 71 a published decision,
provided the court of appeals with its first opportunity to explore the
scope of this restriction in the context of hidden disabilities and to
determine whether the ADA creates a private cause of action for an
improper medical inquiry.172 Harrison demonstrates the risk of asking
medical questions at the wrong time and place in the hiring process.
Harrison, an epileptic, sought employment with Benchmark through
a temporary employment service. After working for a while as a
temporary employee, Benchmark eventually asked him to submit an
application for regular employment. As a condition of employment,
however, Harrison was required to undergo mandatory drug testing.
Harrison tested positive for a prohibited substance on the drug test due
to the presence of a medication he lawfully took to control his epilepsy.
Benchmark was notified of the positive test result, and one of Harrison's
supervisors notified Harrison of the test results. At that time, Harrison
disclosed his medical condition to the supervisor who then telephoned
the employer's medical review officer. The medical review officer
questioned Harrison over the telephone about his epilepsy while the
supervisor remained in the room with Harrison. While the medical
review officer eventually cleared Harrison's drug test result, the
supervisor thereafter declined to extend an employment offer to Harrison
and additionally requested that the temporary agency no longer assign
Harrison to any available work at Benchmark. The temporary agency
thereupon fired Harrison.a73
Harrison sued Benchmark under the ADA asserting a number of
distinct claims, including an attempted cause of action based upon an
improper medical inquiry. The district court granted summary judgment

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX2)(A).
593 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1209-10.
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for the employer on the medical inquiry claim.1 4 On appeal the panel
reversed, finding that the supervisor's presence in the room could lead
a reasonable jury to infer that the employer violated the ADA."'
The court of appeals concluded that a job applicant may sue a
prospective employer for making a prohibited medical inquiry during the
pre-job offer stage regardless of whether the applicant is disabled under
the ADA." 6 The panel determined that 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) provides
a private cause of action for any violation of its restrictions.17 7 'The
regulations clarify that while it is appropriate for an employer to inquire
into an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions, it is illegal for
him to make targeted disability-related inquiries."1e
Although [Benchmark] was permitted to ask follow-up questions to
ensure that Harrison's positive drug test was due to a lawful prescription, a jury may find that these questions exceeded the scope of the
likely-to-elicit standard, and that [the supervisor's] presence in the
room violated the ADA. .. . A reasonable jury could infer that [the
supervisor's] presence in the room was an intentional attempt likely to
elicit information about a disability in violation of the ADA's prohibition against pre-employment medical inquiries. 7 1

C. Res Judicata
Two ADA cases decided during the survey period concerned the issue
of res judicata. Under the res judicata doctrine, a subsequent action is
barred when four requirements are met: (1) there must be "a final
judgment on the merits;" (2) "the prior decision must have been rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction;" (3) the "parties or their privies"
must be identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action must be
involved in both cases."s Both decisions decided during the survey
period affirmed ruling for employers on the fourth prong of the res
judicata doctrine.
In Horne v. Potter,' the plaintiffs complaint had been dismissed
On appeal, the plaintiffbelow because of a prior similar lawsuit.'
appellee, Horne, asserted a number of grounds as error, including that

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1209, 1217.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001).
392 F. App'x 800 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 801.
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her two claims were distinct and distinguishable. The district court
concluded, however, that the plaintiff's second attempted lawsuit arose
out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the claims asserted in the
plaintiff's first complaint.'8 Principally, the plaintiff argued that since
she had received two different letters from her employer advising her of
the termination of her employment, each cause of action was based on
However, the court of
a separate adverse employment action."
based
on the same operative
were
the
two
letters
that
appeals concluded
attempted claim."'
second
facts; therefore, res judicata barred Horne's
Inc.,1as the
Markets,
Super
To the same effect, in Hodges v. Publix
and
the
Family
under
plaintiff attempted to bring an ADA action
7
and
after previously commencing
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),'
Hodges contended on
dismissing with prejudice a prior action."
appeal that "his ADA and FMLA claims" were different and "did not
arise out of the same nucleus of operative factis]" as his prior claim.'a
He argued that his FMLA cause of action challenged only his termination from employment while his ADA lawsuit challenged his former
employer's refusal to rehire him. Hodges attempted to distinguish his
claims, asserting that res judicata did not bar his second suit because
the facts on which it was based were not in existence when his first suit
began. 9 o The panel rejected this assertion, finding instead that the
facts he alleged in the second suit were already in existence when
Hodges filed his first suit and that he had actually alleged the same
"Accordingly, [the court held] that Hodges could
facts in both suits.'
have raised his ADA and [FMLAI claims in Hodges I, and therefore the
district court did not err in dismissing the present action as barred by
the doctrine of res judicata."192

183. Id.
184. Id. at 803.
185. Id. at 804-05.
186. 372 F. App'x 74 (11th Cir. 2010).
187. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
188. Hodges, 372 F. App'x at 75.
189. Id. at 76.
190. Id. at 76-77.
191. Id. at 77.
192. Id.
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IV. SECTION 1981
A.

MinisterialExemption
In an unpublished decision, a panel concluded that the ministerial
exemption applies to § 1981193 causes of action. 1 94 In McCants v.
Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church,
Inc.,195 the district court's dismissal of a cause of action based upon the
ministerial exemption was affirmed."
McCants sued over his failure
to be reappointed as a pastor. He contended that the decision was made
due to his race. The district court's dismissal of the suit was based upon
the ministerial exemption.197 The panel agreed with the district court
that the exemption extends to § 1981 causes of action.19 s
B.

ContractRights
The case of Jimenez v. Wellstar Health System"'s presented an
interesting analysis of the contours of contract requirement in § 1981
causes of action. The defendants, a private health care provider and
physicians and administrators associated with a Georgia hospital, had
suspended the African-American plaintiff's medical staff privileges at the
hospital. The plaintiff thereupon sued under § 1981 claiming impairment of his right to contract due to his race. Concluding that the
plaintiff had no contract right or property interest in continuing medical
staff privileges at the hospital under Georgia law, the district court

193. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
194. Title VII expressly provides that its provisions do not apply "to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1. There is no similar provision in § 1981.
195. 372 F. App'x 39 (11th Cir. 2010).
196. Id. at 40.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 42. Relying on Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir.
1974), the court concluded "that civil courts are not an appropriate forum for review of
internal ecclesiastical decisions." 372 F. App'x at 42. In Bonner v. City of Pritchard,the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to the close of business on September 20, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
199. 596 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2010). To state a cause of action under § 1981, a plaintiff
must allege an interference with a right enumerated under the statute. Kinnon v. Arcoub,
Copman and Associates, Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 2007).
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dismissed the action as failing to state a claim under § 1981.200 The
court of appeals affirmed.2 01
V. SECTION 1983
A.

Pickering Balancing
Demonstrating that the Pickering doctrine2 02 continues to be a force
in § 1983203 causes of action, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's order of summary judgment in a somewhat salacious case.204
The plaintiff, a former county firefighter supervisor, sued the county
after he was demoted following revelations of his extra-marital affair
with a subordinate employee. The plaintiff argued that he had a
fundamental First Amendment 205 right to associate with and have an
intimate relationship with subordinate employees in the workplace. 0o
Applying the Pickering balancing test, the court of appeals concluded
that while that might be so, "the County's interest in discouraging
intimate associations between supervisors and subordinates [was] so
critical to the effective functioning of [the] Fire Department that" the fire
department's interest outweighed any First Amendment right that the
plaintiff may have enjoyed to intimately associate with a subordinate. 207 Thus, a public employer remains free to regulate such
conduct.

B.

Qualified Immunity
Two noteworthy qualified immunity decisions were decided during the
survey period. The first, Ham v. City of Atlanta,20 8 concerned reverse
discrimination. 209 The second, Hickey v. Columbus Consolidated
~ ~
h applicability of the broadened retaliation
Government,2101concerned
the
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern &

200. Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1307-08.
201. Id. at 1310-11.
202. The doctrine derives from the plurality decision from the Supreme Court in
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). "Pickeringbalancing, in the public
employment context, involves the weighing of the employee's interest in the exercise of a
constitutional right against the employer's interest in maintaining an efficient workplace."
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1112 (11th Cir. 1997) (Toflat, J., concurring).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
204. Starling v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 602 F.3d 1257, 1260-61, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
205. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
206. Starling, 602 F.3d at 1259-60.
207. Id. at 1261.
208. 386 F. App'x 899 (11th Cir. 2010).
209. Id. at 900.
210. 372 F. App'x 11 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White2 11 to claims arising prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncement of that decision.21 2
In Ham, a Caucasian fire rescue department's employee, who was
passed over for promotion sued the city and its fire chief claiming
reverse discrimination. 23" The lower court held that the fire chief was
not entitled to qualified immunity based upon the facts alleged.2 14 It
had been alleged that the fire chief told an employee that "he could not
appoint a white male to the [promotional] positioii" in question and that
the chief had also made other statements indicating that he considered
race in making appointments. 21' Based upon that evidence, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the chief's actions, if
proven, constituted a violation of a clearly established constitutional

right.216

In Hickey the district court had concluded that the broadened
retaliation standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern applied to a claim of retaliation arising prior to the announcement of the Burlington Northern decision."' The court of appeals
reversed, specifically finding that
subsequent law cannot be applied in a qualified immunity context
unless pre-existing law, at the time of the allegedly unlawful conduct,
is clearly established such that it would give notice to a reasonable
official of the wrongfulness of the conduct.. . . [The defendant's] actions
. . .must be evaluated under the clearly established law existing at the
time of the alleged unlawful conduct. . . .218
Under the law that existed in the Eleventh Circuit in January 2006, a
"decision to reprimand or transfer an employee, if rescinded before the
employee suffers a tangible harm, [was] not an adverse employment
action."2 1 9 While Burlington Northern might have changed the
standard, it had no retroactive effect in the qualified immunity context.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Hickey, 372 F. App'x at 13.
386 F. App'x at 900.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 906-08.
Id. at 906.
372 F. App'x at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. (citing Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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SECTION 1985 AND LIMITATION ON CAUSES OF ACTION

Jimenez v. Wellstar Health System220 also presented the court of
appeals with an opportunity to clarify that only limited rights under
Section 1985221 are enforceable against private conspirators.2
Jimenez alleged in his civil complaint a conspiracy to violate his
§ 1981223 rights.2 24 The panel concluded that § 1981 cannot serve as
a basis for a claim under § 1985.2% Only those limited rights specifically set forth within § 1985 are enforceable against private conspirators
under § 1985.2
VII.

SECTION 1988 AND CALCULATION OF THE PROPER FEE

In a case arising out of the Eleventh Circuit, a very divided Supreme
Court provided some clarity to § 1988227 concerning the availability of
enhanced fees. In Perdue v. Kenny,2 2 8 the Court reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals, unanimously reaffirming the principal that an
attorney fee award under § 1988 can include an enhancement for
superior performance, but that such enhancements should be granted
only in extraordinary circumstances.229 The lodestar calculation is the
usual measure of such awards, according to the Court.23 0 The Court
split five to four on the question of whether the enhancement, which the
district court granted and the court of appeals affirmed, was proper in
this particular case.2"'
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito observed "that an enhancement
may not be awarded based on a factor that is subsumed in the lodestar
calculation," such as the case's novelty and complexity, or the quality of

220. 596 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2006).
222. Jiminez, 596 F.3d at 1312.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
224. Jiminez, at 1311-12.
225. Id. at 1312.
226. Id. "The only rights the Supreme Court has expressly declared enforceable against
private conspirators under § 1985(3) are the right to interstate travel and the right against
involuntary servitude." Id.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
228. 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
229. Id. at 1669.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1669, 1678. Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in
the opinion of the Court. Justices Kennedy and Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice
Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayer joined. Id. at 1669.
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the attorneys' performance.232 A strong presumption exists that the
lodestar is reasonable and can only be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately account for the
properly considered facts. 3 Justice Alito further noted that the party
making the fees application has the burden to prove that an enhancement is necessary.'" In order to do so, the party must submit specific
evidence supporting the award.235 Because the trial court had failed
to provide a sufficiently specific explanation for various aspects of its fee
determination in this case, the case was remanded for further proceedings.2 36 The decision is expected to have general application in the
employment area as fees awarded under § 1988 are subject to the same
general standards applied to attorney fees awarded under the whole
range of federal employment discrimination statutes.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Employment law continued its subtle evolution in the Eleventh Circuit
during the survey period. Significantly, this year more published
decisions were issued than in recent years.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 1673.
Id.
Id. at 1669.
Id.
Id. at 1676-77.
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